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ABSTRACT

of the dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

**THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF THE SAFAVID ERA PHILOSOPHER SADRADDIN
SHIRAZI**

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Applicant: **Ibrahim Rafail Baghirov**

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Scientific supervisor: Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy,
Associate Professor
Aladdin Mehman Malikov

Official opponents: Doctor of Philosophical Sciences,
Professor
Ayyub Sevdim Karimov

Doctor of Philosophy in Theology,
Associate Professor
Sabina Hamid Mirzayeva

Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy,
Associate Professor
Rubaba Bahadir Shirinova

One-Time Dissertation Council BFD 4.03 of the Supreme Attestation Commission under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, operating at the Azerbaijan Institute of Theology

Chairman of the
Dissertation council

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences,
Associate Professor
Zakiyya Aghababa Abilova

Scientific secretary of the
Dissertation Council:

Doctor of Philosophy in Theology,
Associate Professor
Mammadali Allahverdi Babashli

Chairman of the Scientific
seminar:

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences,
Associate Professor
Lala Jafar Movsumova

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESEARCH

Relevance and extent of research on the topic. Learning is one of the fundamental spiritual needs of the human being as a conscious entity. Without this intrinsic drive, humanity would likely not have reached its current stage of development, transformed the external world, or progressed as a species. This quest for understanding extends beyond the external world; it also encompasses the profound endeavor to comprehend itself. When we examine the history of philosophy, we see that this desire is ancient. Questions about the essence of human beings have always been relevant, both in everyday life and in academia. Questions such as “What is a human being?” “Is a human merely a material being, or does he possess a soul?” and “If the soul exists, what is its nature?” have consistently preoccupied humanity, stemming from the fundamental desire for self-understanding. These questions, which the cognitive and neurological sciences also seek to answer today, were primarily the domain of philosophy previously.

The dualist conception, which views humans as a composite of an immaterial soul and a material body, is believed to have emerged under the influence of religious-mystical traditions. In these traditions, individual spiritual experience played a leading role, and subjective interpretations often predominated over objective reasoning. As a result, these teachings sometimes proposed ideas that excessively emphasized the soul while regarding the body as an obstacle or a ‘cage’ for the soul, as in the ‘bird-cage’ metaphor, views that were inconsistent with objective reality.¹ Although there are exceptional instances in philosophical history, the majority of philosophers have regarded human as being composed of an immaterial soul and a material body, attempting to explain all mental (spiritual) states of it through the concept of the soul.

In contemporary philosophy of mind, which is closely linked to the positive sciences, the dualist framework has become increasingly

¹ Bünyadzadə, K. Sufi fenomenologiya: [2 cilddə] / K. Bünyadzadə, – Bakı: “Zərdabi Nəşr” MMC, – c. 1. – 2023. – s. 45-46.

unpopular and is now largely regarded as a historical concept. Today, the dominant approach in philosophy of mind is materialism or physicalism. According to materialism, there is only one type of substance in the universe: material substance. Thus, the mind, consciousness, and all other states traditionally considered immaterial can be understood as physical phenomena based on matter. In other words, mental states correspond to the physical states of the brain.² However, there is no substantial scientific or philosophical evidence to substantiate this physicalist position. The cognitive or conscious phenomena presumed to arise from material processes in the brain, which transcend the boundaries of the material world, fundamentally differ from the material realm and cannot be apprehended through sensory perception or material means. As such, neither science nor science-based philosophy has successfully explained these phenomena.³

Therefore, it is not entirely reasonable to dismiss the concept of the immaterial soul as merely a historical phenomenon, nor to disregard the views of philosophers who have defended such notions as irrelevant. Thus, the examination of the works and ideas of philosophers who accept the concept of the soul remains an essential and valuable endeavor in the pursuit of understanding the nature of human being.

As is noted, throughout the history of philosophy, humans have primarily been considered as complex beings composed of an immaterial soul and a physical body. The main problem facing this dualist conception is the nature of the relationship between these two separate substances. This issue, referred to as the “mind-body problem,” is the fundamental challenge that calls classical theories of the soul into question. Sadraddin Shirazi, whose philosophical views are the focus of this dissertation, addresses this issue in a manner distinct from the dualist philosophers of his time, offering a perspective that is uniquely his own. While accepting the soul in

² Nagel, T. Bütün bunlar nə deməkdir? Fəlsəfəyə çox qısa bir giriş / T. Nagel, tərc. Emin İmanlı, – Bakı: Aqora fəlsəfə akademiyası, – 2023, – s. 57.

³ Xəlilov, S.S. Mənəviyyat fəlsəfəsi / S.S. Xəlilov, – Bakı: “Azərbaycan Universiteti” nəşriyyatı, – 2007, – s. 40-41.

accordance with his idiosyncratic metaphysics, he does not regard it as an entity separate from material body. According to Shirazi, the soul evolves from the material body and acquires spirituality. Shirazi's concept of the soul, which offers a distinct perspective on the mind-body problem, is also noteworthy from the standpoint of modern philosophy of mind. Therefore, it is essential to investigate Shirazi's concept of the soul in the context of the mind-body problem.

On the other hand, the study of Safavid philosophy and philosophers, as a component of Islamic philosophy, is also significant in correcting certain prevailing misconceptions about the development of Islamic philosophy after the 13th century. As is known, some Orientalist claims, first articulated in the 19th century and still influential in contemporary literature, assert that philosophy in the Islamic world declined after the 13th century or lost its originality, becoming a repetitive tradition. However, the intellectual activities during the Safavid period demonstrate the exact opposite.

Thus, the study of the philosophy of Sadraddin Shirazi, one of the most prominent representatives of this period, who distinguished himself through his unique approaches to philosophical problems, holds particular importance in dispelling these erroneous views. At the same time, this research will also highlight the significance and role of the Safavid state in ensuring the continuity of rational thought in the Islamic world. Therefore, this study can be considered a modest contribution to the broader field of Safavid intellectual and philosophical history.

Fundamental research on Eastern (Islamic) philosophy and its integral component Azerbaijani philosophy has been conducted in Azerbaijan since the Soviet era. Among the scholars of this period, the contributions of Zumrud Quluzadeh⁴, Solmaz Rzaquluzadeh⁵, and Zakir Mammadov⁶ deserve special mention. In particular, Zakir

⁴ Кулизаде, З.А. Теоретические проблемы истории культуры Востока и низамиведение / З.А. Кулизаде – Баку: Elm və təhsil, – 2023. – 372 с.

⁵ Рзакулизаде, С.Д. Мировоззрение Баба Кухи Бакуви / С.Д. Рзакулизаде – Баку: Элм, – 1978. – 93 с.

⁶ Məmmədov, Z.C. Orta əsr Azərbaycan filosofları və mütəfəkkirləri / Z.C. Məmmədov, – Bakı: Azərnəşr – 1986, – 63 s.

Mammadov, in his work *The History of Azerbaijani Philosophy*⁷, discusses the philosophy of the Safavid period and examines the intellectual legacy of Rajabali Tabrizi, one of the representatives of the Isfahan School.

Among recent studies in this field, *Eastern Philosophy and Philosophers* by Aghayar Shukurov⁸, *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Islam*⁹ by Govhar Bakhshaliyeva and Ammar Abbasov; *Islamic Philosophy: History and Modernity*¹⁰ by Konul Bunyadzade; *Islamic Philosophy: Medieval-Modern Period*¹¹ by Anar Qafarov and Aqil Shirinov; and *Religion and Philosophy in Medieval Islamic Thought*¹² and *Annotated Dictionary of Islamic Philosophical Terms*¹³ by Elvusal Mammadov can be given as examples. As for works related to the mind-body problem, which is the subject of this dissertation, examples include *The Philosophy of Spirituality*¹⁴ by Salahaddin Khalilov; and *Human: The Architectonics of Perfection*¹⁵ and *Sufi Phenomenology*¹⁶ by Konul Bunyadzade.

Regarding the research on the philosophy of Sadraddin Shirazi, it should be noted that Shirazi's philosophy is relatively new as an

⁷ Məmmədov, Z.C. Azərbaycan fəlsəfəsi Tarixi / Z.C. Məmmədov, – Bakı: “Şərq-Qərb” – 2006, – 328 s.

⁸ Şükürov, A.M. Şərq fəlsəfəsi və filosofları / A.M. Şükürov, – Bakı: Əbilov Zeynalov və oğulları – 2005, – 668 s.

⁹ Baxşəliyeva, G.B., Abbasov, Ə.S. İslam. Ensiklopedik lüğət / G.B. Baxşəliyeva, Ə.S. Abbasov, – Bakı: “Elm”, – 2013, – 656 s.

¹⁰ Bünyadzadə, K. İslam fəlsəfəsi: tarix və müasirlik / K. Bünyadzadə, – Bakı: Çayıoğlu, – 2010, – 154 s.

¹¹ Qafarov, A., Şirinov, A. İslam fəlsəfəsi: orta əsrlər-modern dövr / A. Qafarov, A. Şirinov, – Bakı: “Nurlar” Nəşriyyat-Poliqrafiya Mərkəzi, – 2019, – 416 s.

¹² Məmmədov, E. Orta əsr islam fikrində din və fəlsəfə / E. Məmmədov, – Bakı: Nurlar, – 2019. – 232 s.

¹³ Məmmədov, E. İzahlı İslam fəlsəfəsi terminləri lüğəti / E. Məmmədov, – Bakı: Nurlar – 2020. – 192 s.

¹⁴ Xəlilov, S.S. Mənəviyyat fəlsəfəsi / S.S. Xəlilov, – Bakı: “Azərbaycan Universiteti” nəşriyyatı, – 2007, – 520 s.

¹⁵ Bünyadzadə, K. İnsan: Kamilliyin arxitektonikası / K. Bünyadzadə, – Bakı: Zərdabi LTD, – 2014, – 494 s.

¹⁶ Bünyadzadə, K. Sufi fenomenologiya / K. Bünyadzadə, – Bakı: Zərdabi Nəşr, – 2023, – 413 s.

object of study for Azerbaijani researchers and has not been extensively investigated. Nevertheless, Azerbaijani scholars have produced several books and articles addressing various aspects of Shirazi's philosophy. Examples include Vuqar Iskandarov's *Mulla Sadra and Transcendental Philosophy*¹⁷, Aladdin Malikov's *Reason and Faith in the Worldviews of Ibn Rushd, Sadr al-Muta'allihin Shirazi, and Immanuel Kant*¹⁸, and *The Theory of the Perfect Human from the Perspective of Mysticism and Philosophy*¹⁹. Malikov's *The Theory of the Perfect Human from the Perspective of Mysticism and Philosophy*, which compares the ideas of Ibn Arabi and Shirazi on the concept of the perfect human, is particularly significant for the topic of this dissertation. Here, the author also discusses Shirazi's views on soul-body relationship. Apart from these, although several articles on Shirazi's philosophy have been written in Azerbaijani, no dissertation or similar research has been conducted on his philosophical psychology or any other topic. In this regard, the current dissertation can be considered the first research work in this direction.

Globally, a significant body of research has been devoted to the philosophy of Sadraddin Shirazi. Although less studied than classical Islamic philosophers, Shirazi's philosophy has become an increasingly popular topic among contemporary researchers of Islamic philosophy. He has been a recognized philosopher in Eastern countries such as Iran, Afghanistan, and India since the Safavid era. Today, Iran remains the country where Shirazi's philosophy is most extensively studied. In this regard, it is particularly important to mention the 'Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Institute' (SIPRI). This research institute has not only undertaken the critical publication of all of Shirazi's works but has also played a significant role in promoting his recognition worldwide by organizing a series of international Shirazi conferences and symposiums. Since the Safavid

¹⁷ İsgəndərov, V. Molla Sədra və müəəliyə fəlsəfəsi / V. İsgəndərov, – Bakı: Victory, – 2012. – 208 s.

¹⁸ ملک اف، ع. عقل و ایمان از دیدگاه ابن رشد، صدر المتألهین شیرازی و ایمانوتل کانت / ع. ملک اف، – قم: مرکز بین المللی ترجمه و نشر المصطفی، – 1390. – 296 ص.

¹⁹ ملک اف، ع. نظریه انسان کامل از دیدگاه عرفان و فلسفه / ع. ملک اف، – قم: مرکز بین المللی ترجمه و نشر المصطفی، – 1390. – 360 ص.

period, Shirazi's philosophy has been a subject of research and teaching in the Iranian philosophical milieu. Among contemporary Iranian scholars who have contributed to this field, we may mention prominent figures such as Mohammad Hossein Tabatabai, Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani, Mostafa Mohageg Damad, and numerous other authors.

In the West, the philosophy of Sadraddin Shirazi began to attract significant attention mainly from the mid-20th century onward. Although earlier studies by Muhammad Iqbal, Edward Browne, and Max Horten introduced him to some extent, it was Henry Corbin who laid the substantial groundwork for Shirazi studies. Corbin played a pivotal role in introducing and exploring the Safavid philosophical heritage in the West. Following Corbin, Toshihiko Izutsu and Seyyed Hossein Nasr produced noteworthy works in this field. Among those who have conducted serious research in this area are Fazlur Rahman, the author of the first doctoral dissertation in English on Shirazi's philosophy, as well as scholars such as Ibrahim Kalin, Alparslan Açıkgenç, Sümeyye Parıldar, Muhammad Abdulhaqq, Yannis Eshots, Zailan Moris, Muhammad Rustem, Muhammad Kamal, Eiyad al-Kutubi, Sajjad Rizvi, Sayeh Meisami, and others, who primarily write in English. Fazlur Rahman, in his work *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*²⁰, al-Kutubi in *Mulla Sadra and Eschatology: Evolution of Being*²¹, and Meisami in *Mulla Sadra*²² have also addressed Shirazi's ideas on the mind-body problem in chapters dedicated to his psychology.

Among the independent research works dedicated to Shirazi's philosophical psychology, the following dissertations and monographs are noteworthy: Abdulaziz Daftari's *Mulla Sadra and the Mind-Body Problem: A Critical Assessment of Sadra's Approach*

²⁰ Rahman, F. *The philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā (Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shirāzī)* / F. Rahman, – Albany: State University of New York Press, –1975. – 222 p.

²¹ Al-Kutubi, E. S. *Mulla Sadra and Eschatology: Evolution of Being* / E. S. Al-Kutubi, – New York: Routledge, – 2015. – 147 p.

²² Meisami, S. *Mulla Sadra* / S. Meisami, – Oxford: Oneworld Publications, – 2013. – 137 p.

to the Dichotomy of Soul and Spirit²³, Sümeyye Parıldar's *Intentionality in Mulla Sadra*²⁴, Sadat Baran's *Psychology in Mulla Sadra: Ilm al-Nafs*,²⁵ Ahmad Pahlavaniyan's *The Soul-Body Relationship from Mulla Sadra's Perspective*²⁶, Mohammad Taqi Yusifi's *Mulla Sadra and the Soul-Body Relationship from the Perspective of the Book and Sunnah*²⁷, Ishaq Tahiri's *The Soul and Its Faculties in the Thought of Aristotle, Ibn Sina, and Sadraddin Shirazi*²⁸, and Mohammad Miri's *The Soul-Body Relationship in Mulla Sadra and Ibn Arabi*.²⁹

In his doctoral dissertation, Daftari explores issues related to the mind-body problem, though his primary aim is not to examine the relationship between the soul and the body but rather to prove the distinction between the soul and the spirit and to discuss Shirazi's ideas on this topic. The Turkish researcher Parıldar, on the other hand, focuses on the problem of intentionality in Shirazi's thought, which is one of the central topics in contemporary philosophy of mind. Another Turkish researcher, Sadat Baran, extensively examines Shirazi's psychology in his work *Psychology in Mulla Sadra: Ilm al-Nafs*, though he does not analyze Shirazi's conception of the soul and body through the prism of the mind-body problem. The works of Iranian researchers Ahmad Pahlavaniyan, Mohammad Taqi Yusifi, Ishaq Tahiri, and Mohammad Miri also provide a broad exploration of Shirazi's conception of the soul and its relationship with the body.

²³ Daftari, A. *Mulla Sadra and the mind-body problem: A critical assessment of Sadra's approach to the dichotomy of soul and spirit: / a thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.* / – Durham, 2010. – 303 p.

²⁴ Parıldar, S. *Intentionality in Mullā Şadrā: / thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy* / – Exeter, 2014. – 271 p.

²⁵ Baran, S. *Molla Sadrada Psikoloji: İlmun-nefs / S. Baran, – İstanbul: Ön Söz yayıncılık, – 2021. – 272 s.*

²⁶ پهلوانیان, احمد. رابطه نفس و بدن از نظر ملاصدرا \ احمد. پهلوانیان, – قم: بوستان کتاب, – 1393. – 232 ص.

²⁷ یوسفی, محمدتقی. رابطه نفس و بدن از دیدگاه ملاصدرا و کتاب و سنت \ محمدتقی. یوسفی, – تهران: انتشارات مؤسسه آموزشی و پژوهشی امام خمینی, – 1397. – 480 ص.

²⁸ طاهری, اسحاق. نفس و قوای آن از دیدگاه ارسطو, ابن سینا و صدرالدین شیرازی / اسحاق. طاهری, – قم: مؤسسه بوستان کتاب, – 1393. – 377 ص.

²⁹ میری, محمد. رابطه نفس و بدن از دیدگاه ابن عربی و ملاصدرا \ محمد. میری, – تهران: انتشارات مؤسسه آموزشی و پژوهشی امام خمینی, – 1397. – 184 ص.

As noted in the studies discussed above, the works conducted in Iran primarily examine Shirazi's ideas on the soul and body and their interrelationship, often in comparison with earlier Islamic philosophers and pre-Sadrian philosophical thought. However, what his theory of the soul-body relationship offers in addressing the mind-body problem, a central issue in the philosophy of mind concerning the impossibility of a relationship between the immaterial soul and the material body, and the challenges it faces, have not yet been sufficiently investigated in scholarly research.

From the points outlined above, we can conclude that, in addition to being the first dissertation on this topic in Azerbaijan, the current research work titled *The Mind-Body Problem in the Philosophy of Safavid Era Philosopher Sadraddin Shirazi* also differs from studies conducted abroad in terms of its approach and the formulation of the problem.

The object and subject of the research. The object of this research is the philosophical psychology of Sadraddin Shirazi, a prominent Islamic philosopher who lived during the Safavid era in the 17th century. To study his philosophical psychology, the research primarily relies on Shirazi's philosophical works, including *Asfar al-Arba'a* (Four Journeys), *Shawahid al-Rububiyya* (Divine Witnesses), *Hikmat al-Arshiyya* (The Wisdom of the Throne).

The subject of the research includes issues such as the mind-body problem in Shirazi's philosophical psychology, the existence and origin of the soul, its relationship with the body, the evaluation of Shirazi's views on the soul-body relationship within the context of the mind-body problem, and their assessment through the lens of dualism and monism.

The aim and objectives of the research. The primary aim of the research is to determine how Sadraddin Shirazi attempts to resolve the mind-body problem within his philosophical psychology and to ascertain whether his approach aligns more closely with dualism or monism. To achieve this goal, the dissertation sets out to accomplish the following tasks:

- To examine the philosophical milieu of Sadraddin Shirazi, along with an exploration of his life and intellectual contributions;

- To analyze the defining characteristics of the philosophical system developed by Sadraddin Shirazi and its principal intellectual sources;

- To investigate the theoretical framework of the mind-body problem by tracing its historical development and exploring main philosophical theories of human nature;

- To analyze the conceptions of the soul in ancient Greek thought, which played a significant role in the formation of philosophical psychology in the Islamic world, and to identify how the problem was formulated within this intellectual tradition;

- To examine the conceptions of the soul proposed by philosophers who preceded Sadraddin Shirazi in the Islamic world and to determine how they addressed and debated the problem;

- To explore the place of philosophical psychology in Sadraddin Shirazi's thought and to elucidate the philosophical principles upon which it is based.

- To explain the essence of Sadraddin Shirazi's theory of the soul as "corporeal in origination, spiritual in subsistence" (jismaniyyat al-huduth, ruhaniyyat al-baqa), and within the framework of this theory, to explore his ideas on the proof of the soul's existence, its definition, its creation, and its nature as an immaterial substance;

- To examine how the relationship between the soul and the body is explained within the context of Shirazi's gradually abstracted soul theory and to determine whether this explanation resolves the mind-body problem.

Research methods. This research employs a methodological framework incorporating descriptive-analytical, comparative, logical-deductive, and historical approaches. The study utilizes a multilingual corpus of both local and international sources, with particular emphasis on consulting primary and original materials relevant to the subject wherever possible.

Main propositions defended. The present research, which investigates Sadraddin Shirazi's philosophical psychology within the framework of the mind-body problem, puts forward the following key propositions:

- Sadraddin Shirazi, who successfully realized the idea of unifying diverse schools of thought within Islamic philosophy, a central tenet of the Isfahan School, which brought together the most creative thinkers of Safavid-era Islamic philosophy, did not limit himself to achieving a superficial synthesis; instead, he developed innovative approaches to a range of philosophical issues and advanced original ideas across multiple domains of philosophy. Among these contributions, his views on psychology ('ilm al-nafs) stand out, providing a unique perspective on the mind-body problem, which had long been regarded as insoluble, and opening new avenues for its interpretation and resolution.

- The most original aspect of Sadraddin Shirazi's psychology, which distinguishes him from earlier philosophers, lies in his theory of the soul's origination. In contrast to Plato, who regarded the soul as independent and pre-existent; Aristotle, who conceptualized it as the form of the body in a manner analogous to the matter-form relationship; or Ibn Sina and other Islamic philosophers, who considered it a created yet immaterial and independent substance, Shirazi argues that the soul, at the initial stage of its creation, is a material-corporeal entity. While it begins as a material form within the body, through the process of substantial motion (al-haraka al-jawhariyya), it undergoes transformation, evolving into a spiritual substance and ultimately attaining the essence of an immaterial soul.

- Sadraddin Shirazi does not regard the human being as a composite entity consisting of two independent substances, a material body and an immaterial soul. While he acknowledges the existence of the immaterial soul, he considers the soul and the body to be different levels of existence within the single ontological reality of the human being. Therefore, he is not a true dualist, and his view on the soul and body leans closer to monism.

- Since Sadraddin Shirazi does not accept the concept of the human being as consisting of two independent, static entities, originating from two distinct substances, namely the immaterial and the material, he does not encounter the mind-body problem based on the impossibility of reconciling material and immaterial entities, as faced by dualists.

- Sadraddin Shirazi does not consider the interaction between immaterial and material substances in general to be impossible. Instead, he deems it impossible for the immaterial soul, as an immaterial substance, to unite with the material body to form a new entity, the human being.

Scientific novelty of the research. This dissertation represents the first PhD-level research in Azerbaijan dedicated to the philosophical psychology of Sadraddin Shirazi, thereby constituting a significant scholarly contribution. Although the topic is not entirely unprecedented in the global academic context, the originality of the study lies in its specific formulation of the problem. Rather than merely explicating his concepts of soul and body, the dissertation situates these within the broader context of the mind-body problem and critically examines whether he offers a resolution to this issue. The final analysis reveals that Shirazi, adopting a monistic worldview, departs significantly from earlier Muslim philosophers by proposing a concept of the soul that largely avoids the classical dichotomy and aligns more closely with objective reality.

Theoretical and practical significance of the research. The dissertation is of theoretical significance in that it explores the evolution of philosophical psychology ('ilm al-nafs) shaped by Greek influence within Islamic philosophy, examines Muslim philosophers' soul theories in the context of the mind-body problem, and, in particular, investigates the perspective of the Safavid philosopher Sadraddin Shirazi on the issue.

The findings of the dissertation are of practical importance as they highlight Shirazi's philosophical psychology as an alternative approach to resolving the mind-body problem. This makes the study a valuable resource for researchers in this field, as well as for scholars of Islamic philosophy in general. In this regard, the dissertation can serve as a reference and recommended source for new research and as a teaching material for students in educational institutions.

Aprobation and application of the research. The main findings and theoretical propositions of the dissertation have been reflected in articles published in various local and international scientific journals, as well as in presentations delivered at national and

international academic conferences.

Name of the organization where the dissertation was conducted. The research was carried out at the Department of Religion and Public Thought at the Institute of Oriental Studies named after Academician Z.M.Bunyadov of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences (ANAS).

The total length of the dissertation, with the volume of each structural section specified in characters. The dissertation comprises the title page (354 characters), table of contents (741 characters), introduction (17,851 characters), three chapters (Chapter I – three subsections, 67,465 characters; Chapter II – three subsections, 93,212 characters; Chapter III – three subsections, 96,124 characters), conclusion (10,159 characters), and a list of references (35,139 characters). The total volume of the dissertation, excluding the list of references, is 285,906 characters.

MAIN CONTENT OF THE DISSERTATION

The “**Introduction**” section of the dissertation justifies the topic’s relevance, outlines its development, and defines the research’s object and subject. It presents goals, objectives, methods, and key propositions for defense, highlighting the work’s scientific novelty, theoretical and practical significance, and its approbation. It also specifies the research organization, dissertation structure, section volumes, and total character count.

The dissertation, consisting of three chapters, has its first chapter titled “**The Environment, Life, and Philosophy of Sadraddin Shirazi,**” which is divided into three sections.

The first section, “**The Scientific-Philosophical Environment and the Revival of Rational Sciences during the Safavid Era,**” discusses the scientific-philosophical environment of the Safavid state during Sadraddin Shirazi’s lifetime and introduces the Isfahan School, which characterizes the philosophical thought of the period.

As is well known, for a long time, particularly among Western researchers, there was a prevailing conviction that philosophical

thought in the Islamic world declined and came to an end after Ibn Rushd.³⁰ Later, some authors argued that this view was entirely unfounded³¹ or not entirely accurate,³² while even today, some researchers maintain that Islamic philosophical thought entered a period of decline after the 12th century.

The research highlights that, as widely acknowledged, philosophical thought in the Islamic world during this period did not decline but rather transformed. The rationalist, Peripatetic philosophy dominant in earlier centuries began to wane in the 12th century, making room for new philosophical systems rooted in distinct epistemological paradigms, which still incorporated reason to some degree. Initially, philosophy, emerging in a realm dominated by religious thought (or revelation), often stood in sharp contrast to it. However, through these new paradigms, it gradually evolved into a more balanced and harmonious form. The apogee of this evolutionary process in Islamic philosophical thought is precisely represented by the philosophy of the Safavid era.

The section concludes that the existence of the Isfahan School and a philosopher like Shirazi, who created comprehensive philosophical systems, shows that claims about the collapse of philosophical thought in the Islamic world may not reflect reality.

The second section of Chapter I, titled **“The Life and Works of Sadraddin Shirazi,”** explores Shirazi’s biography and provides a brief overview of his major works.

It has been established that the biography of Muhammad ibn Ibrahim ibn Yahya al-Qawami al-Shirazi, known as Mulla Sadra, is marked by significant historical uncertainties regarding almost all

³⁰ De Boer, T. J. *The History of Philosophy in Islam* / T. J. De Boer, – New York: Dover Publications, – 1967. – 216 p.; Watt, W.M. *Islamic Philosophy and Theology* / W.M. Watt, – Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press – 1985. – 175 p.

³¹ Corbin, H. *History of Islamic philosophy* / H. Corbin, – London: In association with Islamic Publications for the Institute of Ismaili Studies, – 1993. – 365 p.

³² Cooper, J. *From al-Tusi to the School of Isfahan // History of Islamic Philosophy,* – 2021, – p. 585-596.

major events in his life. Modern sources indicate his birth year as 1571–1572.

After receiving his early education in his hometown, Shirazi continued his studies in Qazvin and Isfahan. Upon completing his education, he returned to Shiraz in the early 1600s, but his stay there was short-lived. For reasons that remain unclear, he moved to the village of Kahak, near the city of Qom in Iran, where he lived a secluded life. It is reported that he remained in Kahak until around 1613.³³ In the following years, Shirazi spent much of his life traveling, but in 1630, he permanently returned to Shiraz after being invited to teach at the newly established Khan Madrasa.

The exact date of his death and burial place remain uncertain. While most sources indicate that he died in Basra, in 1640/1641, some accounts suggest that he passed away in 1635/1636 and was later buried in Najaf.³⁴

After providing an overview of his teachers in philosophy and religious sciences, as well as his notable students he trained, the second section explores his scholarly contributions, highlighting his extensive body of work, which comprises over fifty known texts spanning both rational and religious sciences. The discussion also addresses differing classifications of his writings before offering a concise overview of his major philosophical works.

The third section of Chapter I, titled “**Sadraddin Shirazi’s Conception of Philosophy: Hikmat al-Muta‘aliya,**” examines the defining characteristics of the transcendent (muta‘ali) school of philosophy, which Shirazi founded. It discusses the epistemological principles on which it is based, as well as the philosophical traditions and thinkers that influenced it.

Although the term “transcendent philosophy” (al-hikmat al-muta‘aliya) appears in the title of Shirazi’s most significant philosophical work, *Four Journeys*, he himself did not explicitly name his system as such. Rather, this designation was later attributed

³³ Rizvi, S.H. *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī: His Life and Works and the Sources for Safavid Philosophy* / S.H. Rizvi, – Oxford: Oxford University Press, – 2007. – s. 14

³⁴ Rizvi, S.H. *Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī: His Life and Works and the Sources for Safavid Philosophy* / S.H. Rizvi, – Oxford: Oxford University Press, – 2007. – s. 30

to his philosophy by his followers.³⁵ While there are various interpretations of the term's meaning, the prevailing view suggests that Shirazi used it in a specific sense, referring to an intellectual activity whose source is divine.³⁶

Shirazi did not perceive a fundamental contradiction between religion and philosophy or between reason and revelation, considering them complementary sources of knowledge. Consequently, he sought to synthesize the methodological approaches of various intellectual traditions in the Islamic world, including Peripatetic philosophy, Illuminationism, Sufism, and Kalam, which respectively emphasized reason, intuitive experience, and revelation as sources of truth. In constructing his philosophical system on these new epistemological principles, Shirazi drew extensively from the preceding intellectual and philosophical heritage. However, the influences of Ibn Arabi, Ibn Sina, and Suhrawardi were particularly significant in shaping his philosophy.

The theoretical propositions developed in this chapter have been reflected in our articles titled “The Revival of Intellectual Sciences during the Safavid Period: Isfahan School of Philosophy and Sadraddin Shirazi,”³⁷ and “Philosophical Methodology and Sources of Sadraddin Shirazi”.³⁸

The second chapter of the dissertation is titled “**The Nature and History of the Mind-Body Problem.**” The chapter consists of three sections. In the first section, titled “**The Nature of the Mind-Body Problem,**” the problematic of the mind-body issue is explained, and the history of its recognition as a philosophical problem is discussed.

³⁵ Nasr, S.H. Molla Sadra ve İlahi Hikmet / S.H.Nasr, terc. M.Armağan. – İstanbul: İnsan yayınları, – 2009. – s. 108

³⁶ الحاج حسن، ع. الحكمة المتعالية عند صدر المتعالين الشيرازي / ع. الحاج حسن، – بيروت: دارالهادي، 2005. – ص. 149

³⁷ Bağirov, İ. Səfəvilər dövründə intellektual elmlərin oyanışı: İsfahan məktəbi və Sədrəddin Şirazi // – Bakı: “Metafizika” jurnalı, – 2024. 7(3), s.41-58.

³⁸ Bağirov, İ. Sədrəddin Şirazinin fəlsəfi metodologiyası və qaynaqları // – Bakı: “Metafizika” jurnalı, – 2023. 6(2), – s. 96-109.

Today, under the umbrella of the mind-body problem, which is the subject of study of the philosophy of mind, numerous distinct issues are debated and investigated. The essence of the issue depends directly on the answers to two fundamental questions at the heart of the mind-body problem. The first question concerns the nature of the soul, while the second pertains to the relationship between that and the body.

Answers given to these questions can be broadly classified into two groups: dualism and monism. Dualism asserts the existence of two fundamentally opposed substances in nature, material and immaterial, and posits that the mind and body are composed of these opposing substances. Monism, on the other hand, accepts only one kind of substance in the universe. However, based on differing views about the nature of this single substance, monism is further divided into subtypes, such as physicalist monism and neutral monism³⁹.

The problems faced by groups adhering to these differing worldviews also vary. In the context of classical philosophy, or for philosophers like Shirazi who embraced the idea of an immaterial soul, the primary challenge was to explain the interaction or unity between the immaterial soul and the material body. If the soul is, by nature, an immaterial entity devoid of all material characteristics, how can it exist within, interact with, or unite with the body, which is entirely material?

Although this problem is often associated with René Descartes,⁴⁰ its origins can be traced back to ancient Greek philosophers. However, it is not without reason that Descartes' name is frequently associated with the mind-body problem. His ideas played a crucial role in framing the issue as a distinct philosophical problem and making it a subject of intense debate. Nevertheless, the distinction between the soul and body as separate substances, which

³⁹ Şirinov, A. Fəlsəfə tarixində ruh-bədən əlaqəsi problemi (qədimdən günümüzə) // – Bakı: Fəlsəfə və sosial-siyasi elmlər, – 2012. 33, №1, – s. 36-49.

⁴⁰ Lagerlund, H. Introduction: The Mind/Body Problem and Late Medieval Conceptions of the Soul // – Dordrecht: Forming The Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment, ed. Henrik L. – London and New York, – 2007. – pp. 1-15.

Descartes defended, was already a dominant view in ancient, medieval and Islamic philosophy.

In the second section of the second chapter, titled **“Concepts of the Soul and the Mind-Body Problem in Ancient Greek Philosophical Thought,”** the pre-philosophical and pre-Socratic conceptions of the soul in the ancient Greek world are examined, followed by an analysis of the ideas of the three great Greek philosophers: Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus.

The concept of the soul (psyche) in Homeric texts, which characterizes the pre-philosophical Greek understanding of the soul, does not correspond to the notion of the soul as understood in philosophy today. Here, the soul is depicted as a “shadowy entity” or a phantom resembling the external form of a person, which neither ensures life nor consciousness.⁴¹ However, in the earliest Greek philosophers, we observe a depiction of the soul as the source of life. Among these philosophers, many, such as Anaximenes, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Xenophanes, and Zeno, associated the soul with material elements like air, fire, earth, and water, adopting a primarily materialist perspective.⁴² In contrast to these predominantly materialist views, Pythagoras held the soul to be immaterial.

After discussing the ideas of these and other pre-Socratic Greek philosophers, this section examines the respective views of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. It is established that the ideas of these Greek philosophers on the subject were more precise and detailed.

Plato, who defended dualism through philosophical arguments, regarded the soul as a separate, abstract entity distinct from the body. Believing that the soul existed before the body, Plato argued that the soul, unlike the complex and composite body, does not perish with the death of the body but continues to exist in different bodies.

The founder of systematic psychology, Aristotle, a student of Plato, opposed Plato’s concept of the soul. For Aristotle, who defined

⁴¹ Rohde, E. *Psyche Yunanlarda Ruhlar Kültü ve Ölümsüzlük İnancı* / E.Rohde, Çev. Özgüç Orhan. – İstanbul: Pinhan Yayıncılık, – 2020. – s. 53-54

⁴² Barnes, J. *The Presocratic Philosophers* / J. Barnes. – London and New York: Routledge, – 2001. – s. 472

the soul as “*the first actuality of a natural body that has organs,*”⁴³ the soul and body are inseparable elements of a single substance, akin to matter and form.

Plotinus, on the other hand, viewed the soul as an intermediate entity possessing characteristics between the absolute abstract and the absolute material realms. While he associated the soul with the divine realm, considering it to have descended from the world of spirits into the material world, he separated it from the material body. In doing so, Plotinus rejected Aristotle’s hylomorphism and Greek materialism, essentially adopting Plato’s dualism.

In the third section of the second chapter, titled “**Concepts of the Soul and the Mind-Body Problem in Classical Islamic Philosophy,**” the ideas of Islamic philosophers on the subject are examined. The section explores the main approaches to the relationship between the soul and the body that existed in the Islamic world up to the time of Sadraddin Shirazi.

For this purpose, the section examines the philosophical views of Peripatetic philosophers such as al-Kindi, al-Farabi, and Ibn Sina, as well as the Illuminationist philosopher Suhrawardi and the Sufi thinker Ibn Arabi. The research establishes that, according to al-Kindi, al-Farabi, and Ibn Sina—representatives of the first philosophical school in the Islamic world, Peripateticism—the human being is a composite entity consisting of an immaterial soul and a material body. For them, the soul is not merely the material form of the body, as seen in Aristotle’s philosophy. Since the soul originates from a substance distinct from matter and is an abstract entity, it continues to exist after the body’s demise. Although their ideas on issues such as the definition, functions, and types of the soul align closely with Aristotle’s views, the Muslim Peripatetics are closer to the Platonic worldview because they regard the soul as an independent entity capable of existing on its own. Thus, they represent dualism.

When it comes to Suhrawardi and Ibn Arabi, one might initially argue that they appear to be dualists. For instance, according to

⁴³ Aritoteles. Ruh Üzerine /. terc. Ö.Aygün, Y.G.Sev, – İstanbul: Pinhn, – 2019. – s. 89

Suhrawardi, the soul belongs to the category of luminous, abstract, and independent entities, and is therefore distinct from the material world to which the body belongs.⁴⁴ Similarly, Ibn Arabi also regards the soul as fundamentally different from the body in terms of its origin.⁴⁵ However, considering that both thinkers view the human being, composed of both soul and body, as a single ontological entity, we can argue that they are not true dualists like the Peripatetics, but rather represent a form of spiritual monism.

The theoretical propositions developed in this chapter are reflected in the following articles and theses: “Plato and Aristotle’s Thoughts on the Soul and its Relations to the Body,”⁴⁶ “Soul Theories in the Classical Period of Islamic Philosophy: al-Kindi (800–870), al-Farabi (873–950), and Avicenna (980–1037),”⁴⁷ “Soul/Mind-Body Problem in Ancient Greek: Pre-Philosophical and Pre-Socratic Periods,”⁴⁸ “Suhrawardi and Ibn Arabi on the Soul and Its Relation to the Body,”⁴⁹ and “Abu Nasr Al-Farabi Al-Turki (873–950) and the Issue of the Immortality of the Soul.”⁵⁰

Chapter III, titled **“The Mind-Body Problem in the Philosophy of Sadraddin Shirazi,”** is divided into three sections. The first section, **“Elm al-Nafs (Psychology) in Shirazi and Its**

⁴⁴ Lopez-Farjeat, L.X. *Classical Islamic Philosophy: a thematic introduction* / L.X. Lopez-Farjeat, – New York: Routledge, – 2022. – s. 218

⁴⁵ İbn Arabi, M. *Özün Özü (Lübbül-Lübb)* / M. İbn Ərəbi, terc. İ.H. Bursevi, – İstanbul: Bahar Yayınları, – 2000. – 122 s.

⁴⁶ Bağırov, İ. *Platon və Aristotelin nəfs və onun bədənə olan münasibətinə dair düşüncələri* // – Bakı: Din araşdırmaları, – 2023. 1 (10), – s. 161-181.

⁴⁷ Bağırov, İ. *Klassik dövr islam fəlsəfəsində nəfs nəzəriyyələri: Kindi (800-870), Fərabı (873-950) və İbn Sina (980-1037) nümunəsi* // – Gəncə: Xəbərlər məcmuəsi, – 2023. 5 (9), – s. 242-252.

⁴⁸ Bağırov, İ. *Antik yunan düşüncəsində ruh/nəfs-bədən problemi: fəlsəfə öncəsi və presokratik dövr* // – Bakı: Gənc tədqiqatçı jurnalı, – 2023, № 4, – s. 142-149.

⁴⁹ Bağirov, I. *Suhrawardi and Ibn Arabi on the Soul and Its Relation to the Body* // ICSAS 2nd International Conference on Humanity and Social Sciences, – Erzurum: Academy Global Publishing House, –19 - 21 April, – 2024, – p. 126-136.

⁵⁰ Bağırov, İ. *Əbu Nəsr Fərabı ət-Türki (873-950) və ruhun ölümsüzlüyü məsələsi* // “Müsləman Şərqiinin çoxəsrlik tarixində dönüş nöqtəsi – Türkiyə Cümhuriyyəti” mövzusunda Beynəlxalq Elmi Konfrans, – Bakı: “Elm”, – 2024, – s. 87-88.

Foundational Principles,” examines Sadraddin Shirazi’s general approach to philosophical psychology, the aspects that distinguish him from other philosophers, and the principles underlying his concept of the soul, particularly the “primacy of existence” (asalat al-wujud) and “substantial motion” (al-harakat al-jawhariyya).

Unlike other Islamic philosophers, Sadraddin Shirazi considers psychology not as a branch of natural philosophy but as a part of metaphysics.⁵¹ In this regard, the principles that form the foundation of his overall philosophy also shape his views on the mind-body problem. Among these principles, the most significant is the theory of the “primacy of existence.” According to Shirazi, all entities in the universe exist through the single objective reality of existence (wujud). Although there are three distinct realms of existence—material, imaginal (psychic), and intellectual—these realms, while differing in essence, are identical in terms of existence. Essences are conditional concepts created by the mind and do not possess external reality. Therefore, the differences that arise in terms of essence do not disrupt the unity of existents in terms of existence. Human souls, as part of this framework, unite these different forms of existence within their singular being.⁵² The actualization of these distinct forms of existence by the soul is made possible through substantial motion. According to the theory of substantial motion, nothing in the material world is static. All material entities possess a dynamic nature and are in a constant state of change and renewal from the moment they come into existence. This characteristic of continuous transformation is not a secondary attribute added to things later. For Shirazi, the very existence of material nature is synonymous with its being in motion.⁵³

The second section of the third chapter, titled “**Shirazi’s Concept of the Soul: The Spiritualization of Corporeal Substance,”** examines Sadraddin Shirazi’s theory of the soul as

⁵¹ شیرازی، ص. الحکمة المتعالیة فی الاسفار الاربعة العقلیة: [فی 9 مجلد] / ص. شیرازی، تج. ع.ا. رشاد - تهران: بنیاد حکمت اسلامی صدرا، ج. 8 - 1383. ص. 631

⁵² شیرازی، صدرالدین. الحکمة المتعالیة فی الاسفار الاربعة العقلیة: [فی 9 مجلد] / صدرالدین. شیرازی، تج. رضا اکبریان، - تهران: بنیاد حکمت اسلامی صدرا، ج. 9 - 1382. ص. 271-272

⁵³ شاوردی، زینب،؛ کوچنای، قاسم علی. محرک غیر متحرک از منظر ملاصدرا // فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، 1399، 53(2)، ص. 427

“corporeal in origin, spiritual in subsistence.” This section explores topics such as the proof of the soul’s existence, its definition, its creation, and the demonstration of its immateriality.

Sadraddin Shirazi’s concept of the soul differs significantly from those of earlier philosophers. He neither accepts Plato’s idea that the soul exists prior to the body nor adopts the dualistic view, upheld by thinkers like Ibn Sina, that the soul is an abstract entity from the moment of its creation. According to Shirazi, the soul comes into existence alongside the body as a material form.⁵⁴ In this regard, he aligns with Aristotle’s definition of the soul as the first perfection of an organic body. Shirazi asserts that, at the moment of its creation, the soul contains no abstract qualities. However, he argues that the soul does not remain a mere material entity; rather, through the process of substantial motion (*al-harakat al-jawhariyya*), it evolves and gradually becomes abstract, acquiring spiritual content.

The human soul, according to Shirazi, progresses through various stages, including the vegetative and animal levels, before reaching the stage of the rational soul, which is characterized by abstract thought.⁵⁵ Like the Peripatetics, Shirazi does not consider the vegetative soul to be abstract. However, he diverges from them by attributing a form of imaginative abstraction to animal souls, which he regards as immortal. In this respect, his view on animal souls differs from the traditional Peripatetic stance. When it comes to the abstract nature of human souls, Shirazi largely agrees with the Peripatetic philosophers. Notably, the arguments he presents for the immateriality of human souls are primarily drawn from the works of Ibn Sina, reflecting a continuity with earlier Islamic philosophical thought.

The final section of the third chapter, titled **“The Relationship Between the Soul and the Body According to Shirazi and the Problem It Faces,”** evaluates Sadraddin Shirazi’s ideas on the relationship between the soul and the body within the context of the

⁵⁴ Şirazi, S. Arşa Ait Hikmetler / S. Şirazi, terc. Fevzi Yiğit, – İstanbul: Önsöz Yayıncılık, – 2022. – s. 48.

⁵⁵ شیرازی، ص. الحکمة المتعالیة فی الاسفار الاربعة العقلیة: [فی 9 مجلد] / ص. شیرازی، تج. ع.ا. رشاد – تهران: بنیاد حکمت اسلامی صدرا، – ج. 8. – 1383. – ص. 156-157.

mind-body problem.

According to Sadraddin Shirazi, the soul's relation to the material body is in its origination. Through the process of substantial motion (*al-harakat al-jawhariyya*), the soul evolves toward abstraction and acquires spiritual content, after which its dependence on the material body ceases.⁵⁶ However, this does not mean that the soul becomes entirely detached from the body in general; rather, it is liberated specifically from the material body. The soul's abstraction from the material body does not imply that it exists without a body. Instead, Shirazi argues that the soul's true body consists of the faculties within its being that perform various functions. These faculties develop in accordance with the level of existence the soul occupies. If the soul is at the material level, its body is material; if it is at the imaginal-abstract level, its body is imaginal; and if it is at the intellectual level, its body takes on an intellectually abstract nature.⁵⁷ This body is not a separate entity from the soul but represents a lower level of the single ontological reality that constitutes the human being. Thus, the soul and the body are not two distinct entities but are ontologically one and the same.

Because Shirazi does not regard the soul and the body as separate entities, his concept of the soul falls within the category of monism. From this perspective, he does not encounter the mind-body problem as it is understood within dualistic frameworks. However, it is important to note that Shirazi's concept of the soul does not solve the mind-body problem faced by dualist philosophers like Ibn Sina and Descartes. It would be more accurate to say that Shirazi avoids the problem altogether by proposing a different understanding of the soul-body relationship.

The theoretical propositions developed in this chapter are reflected in the following articles and theses: "Sadraddin Shirazi's Corporeal Originated and Spiritual Subsisted Soul Concept as an

⁵⁶ شیرازی، ص. الحکمة المتعالیة فی الاسفار الاربعة العقلیة: [فی 9 مجلد] / ص. شیرازی، تج. ع. ا. رشاد - تهران: بنیاد حکمت اسلامی صدرا، - ج. 8 - 1383. - ص. 380
⁵⁷ گرجیان، محمدمهدی؛ رودگر، نرجس. سه اقلیم بدن؛ بررسی مقایسه‌ای معاد جسمانی از منظر صدر المتألهین و آقا علی حکیم (مدرس زنوزی) // قبسات، - شماره 58، - ص. 85-114.

Answer to the Mind-Body Problem,”⁵⁸ “On the Origin of Human Souls: The Case of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Mullah Sadra (Sadraddin Shirazi),”⁵⁹ “Sadraddin Shirazi’s Concept of Soul,”⁶⁰ “Elm al-Nafs (Psychology) in Islamic Philosophy: The Perspective of Sadraddin Shirazi,”⁶¹ “Mulla Sadra and the Mind-Body Problem,”⁶² and “Sadraddin Shirazi on the Invalidity of Reincarnation.”⁶³

The “**Conclusion**” section of the dissertation summarizes the research and presents the following key findings:

1. Although Sadraddin Shirazi accepts Aristotle’s definition of the soul as the “*first perfection of a natural organic body*,” he does not regard the soul as a mere material form, as Aristotle did, nor as a subtle body like fire, air, or vapor, as believed by some pre-Socratic philosophers. Similarly, he rejects the dualist view, upheld by thinkers like Ibn Sina, that the soul is a purely abstract and simple substance from the moment of its creation. Instead, Shirazi considers the soul of a dynamic nature that encompasses different forms of existence from its beginning to its end. To him, the soul is “corporeal in its origination, spiritual in its subsistence.” Originally, the soul is a material substance that lacks actual spirituality but possesses the potential to evolve into spirit. Through the process of substantial motion, this material soul gradually actualizes its spiritual potential,

⁵⁸ Baghirov, I. Sadraddin Shirazi’s Corporeal Originated and Spiritual Subsisted Soul Concept as an Answer to The Mind-Body Problem // Перспективи. Соціально-політичний журнал – 2024, № 1, – p. 23-32.

⁵⁹ Baghirov, I. On the Origin of Human Souls: The Case of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Mullah Sadra (Sadraddin Shirazi) // Akademik Tarih ve Düşünce Dergisi, – 2024, 11 (5), – p. 3575-3585.

⁶⁰ Bağirov, İ. Sədrəddin Şirazinin nəfs konsepsiyası // “Metafizika” Jurnalı – 2023, 6 (4), s. 47-64.

⁶¹ Bağirov, İ. İslam fəlsəfəsində elmun-nəfs (psixologiya): Sədrəddin Şirazinin görüşü // “Vətəni sevməyən insan olmaz” mövzusunda Respublika elmi konfransı, – Bakı: “AFPoliqrAF”, – 2024, – s. 352-356.

⁶² Bağirov, İ. Molla Sadra ve ruh-beden problemi // Beyşehir Selcuklu 1st International Conference on Humanity and Social Sciences, – Beyşehir: Academy Global Publishing House, – 27-29 October, – 2023, – s. 492.

⁶³ Bağirov, İ. Sadreddin Şirazi reenkarnasyonun geçersizliği üzerine // International Marmara Scientific Studies Congress, – Istanbul: ASES Publications, – 22-23 July, – 2024, – s. 197-198.

ultimately acquiring spiritual content. Once transformed into spirit, the soul gains the ability to exist independently of the physical body, thereby attaining immortality.

2. Sadraddin Shirazi's concept of the body, much like his concept of the soul, is distinctive. When analyzing Aristotle's definition of the soul, we observe that Shirazi interprets the organs constituting the body as the powers inherent in the nature of the soul. According to him, the true body of the soul consists of the faculties that are integral to its existence and enable it to perform various functions. These faculties determine the type of body the soul possesses, corresponding to the realm of existence it inhabits: in the material realm, the soul has a material body; in the imaginal realm, an imaginal body; and in the intellectual realm, an intellectual, abstract body. Hence, Shirazi argues that the soul is never without a body in any realm of existence and that the relationship between the soul and the body is natural and inseparable.

3. Although Shirazi employs expressions in his works that suggest the human being is composed of two entities, soul and body, he does not posit a true dualism between them. Rather, he views the soul and body as different degrees of intensity within the hierarchy of human existence. To him, it is not possible for the immaterial substance of the soul to unite with the material body to form a single species. Accordingly, he argues that the soul's association with the physical body is only possible because the soul itself possesses a degree of materiality at the moment of its origination. Even though the soul attains a certain level of abstraction before death, it never becomes fully abstract, which allows for its continued unity with the body through its material connection. Upon death, however, the soul achieves complete abstraction and transforms into an independent substance, separate from the worldly body. The view that the body and soul are not two independent substances but rather distinct levels of human existence makes Shirazi's philosophical psychology more aligned with monism than dualism. Since existence itself is the principle that unites the soul and body, his monism can be characterized as

“existential monism.”

4. Since Şadr al-Din al- Shirazi defends the ontological unity of the soul and body, it would be incorrect to discuss the mind-body problem in his philosophy in the way it is typically framed within substantive dualism, namely, as the impossibility of interaction between a material body and an immaterial soul. In other words, Shirazi does not encounter this version of the mind-body problem. The root of this problem lies in the assumption that the soul and body are composed of fundamentally opposing substances. However, according to Shirazi, the body of the soul exists in a manner corresponding to the ontological level at which the soul itself resides. If the soul is at a material stage, its body is material; if it is at a spiritual stage, its body possesses a spiritual nature. Consequently, no contradiction arises, as the soul is never in conflict with the nature of the body with which it is associated.

5. When it comes to whether Sadraddin Shirazi resolves the mind-body problem, which is based on the perceived impossibility of a relationship between the material body and the immaterial soul, as discussed in contemporary philosophy of mind, we believe it is not accurate to assert this unequivocally. This is because Shirazi does not so much propose a solution to the relationship between these two opposing substances as he introduces a new concept of the soul that allows him to avoid the problem altogether. To be more precise, he denies the immateriality of the soul at the moment of its creation to make its unity with the material body possible. Since both components of the human being, the soul and the body, are material, the problem does not arise. However, this approach does not explain the relationship or unity between the material body and the abstract soul; rather, it denies the immateriality of the soul. In other words, for those who accept the immateriality of the soul, the problem remains unresolved. Interestingly, while Shirazi claims that the soul is originally material, he also accepts that it later transforms into spirit and becomes abstract. This leads to a similar problem within his own philosophy. It is noteworthy that Shirazi, who denies the spirituality of the soul at its creation to avoid the

impossibility of its unity with the body, does not consider the unity of the subsequently abstracted soul with the body to be paradoxical.

The main theses and findings of the dissertation are reflected in the author's following scholarly publications:

1. Platon və Aristotelin nəfs və onun bədənə olan münasibətinə dair düşüncələri // – Bakı: Din araşdırmaları, – 2023. 1 (10), – s. 191-212.
2. Sədrəddin Şirazinin fəlsəfi metodologiyası və qaynaqları // – Bakı: “Metafizika” jurnalı, – 2023. 6 (2), – s. 96-109.
3. Əbu Nəsr Fərabî ət-Türki (873-950) və ruhun ölümsüzlüyü məsələsi // “Müsəlman Şərqi çoxəsrlilik tarixində dönüş nöqtəsi – Türkiyə Cümhuriyyəti” mövzusunda Beynəlxalq Elmi Konfrans, – Bakı: “Elm”, – 2023, – s. 87-88.
4. Molla Sadra və ruh-beden problemi // Beyşehir Selcuklu 1st International Conference on Humanity and Social Sciences, – Beyşehir: Academy Global Publishing House, – 27-29 October, – 2023, – s. 492.
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6. Klassik dövr islam fəlsəfəsində nəfs nəzəriyyələri: Kindi (800-870), Fərabî (873-950) və İbn Sina (980-1037) nümunəsi // – Gəncə: Xəbərlər məcmuəsi, – 2023. 5 (9), – s. 242-252.
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Address: Mahammad Nakchivani 29, Baku AZ1065, Azerbaijan
Tel: +994 12 436 77 66
Email: info@ait.edu.az

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